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Opening questions about “things” onto the bureaucratically-maintained, 
compartmentalized discursive, disciplinary claims of “philosophy,” “theory,” and 
“poetry,” “Urgent Matter” explores these three terms in relation to one another 
through attention to recent work by Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Rancière, the 
German-American poet Rosmarie Waldrop, and the German poet Ulf Stolterfoht, 
whose fachsprachen. Gedichte. I-IX (Lingos I-IX. Poems) Waldrop rendered into 
English in an award-winning translation. The difference between the "things" 
called "poetry" and "philosophy," as now institutionalized within the academy, is 
not epistemological, ontological, ahistorical, but a matter of linguistic domains, of 
so-called concrete "images" as the policed domain of the former and of 
"abstraction" as the policed domain of the latter. Challenging the binary logics 
that dominate language use in diverse discursive/disciplinary cultures, Waldrop’s 
linguistically self-referential, appositional procedures develop ways to use 
language that are neither linear, nor so much without direction, as multi-
directional, offering complexes of adjacency, of asides, of digression, of errancy, 
of being “alongside,” in lieu of being “opposed to,” that constitute at once a 
poetics, an aesthetics, an ethics, and a politics.  Elaborating a complementary 
understanding of poetry as “the most philosophic of all writing,” a medium of 
being “contemporary,” Waldrop and Stolterfoht question poetry’s purposes as 
one kind of language apparatus among others in the general economy. Whatever 
poetry might be, it aspires to be in their hands not a thing in itself but a form of 
self-questioning, of all discourses, all disciplines, that “thing” that binds “poetry” 
and “philosophy” together, as urgent matter, in continuing. 
 
Jonathan Monroe’s recent articles and book contributions include his forthcoming 
chapter on “Genre” for Literature Now: Key Terms and Methods for Literary 
History (2015); "Poetry, Philosophy, Parataxis"; "Composite Cultures, Chaos 
Wor(l)ds: Relational Poetics, Textual Hybridity, and the Future of Opacity"; 
"Autrement Dire: La poussée vers l'abstraction de Rosmarie Waldrop"; "Los 
amores y juegos del joven Berger" (in Bolaño Salvaje); and "Every Person, Many 
Studies" (in the ADFL Bulletin). Professor of Comparative Literature at Cornell 
University, he is the author of A Poverty of Objects: The Prose Poem and the 
Politics of Genre; Demosthenes’ Legacy, a collection of prose poems and short 
fiction; and co-author and editor of two special issues on modern and 
contemporary poetry— Poetry, Community, Movement (Diacritics), and 
Aftershock: Poetry and Cultural Politics since 1989 (Poetics Today)—as well as 
two books on writing in the academy: Writing and Revising the Disciplines and 
Local Knowledges, Local Practices: Writing in the Disciplines at Cornell. His 
verse and prose poetry, short fiction, and cross-genre writing have appeared as 
well in numerous journals, including The American Poetry Review, Epoch, 
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Harvard Review, /nor New Ohio Review, Verse, Volt, and Xcp: Cross-Cultural 
Poetics. A former DAAD Fellow at the Universität Konstanz, he has served as a 
steering committee member of Cornell's Institute for German Cultural Studies; as 
a member of the Fulbright selection committee; and as Director of Cornell’s John 
S. Knight Institute for Writing in the Disciplines. His current research focuses on 




A poem is primarily an exploration of language.  
Rosmarie Waldrop, Dissonance  (if you 
are interested)  
 
This brings us to the difficulties of existence and 
accepted theories. . . . . Was the line an illusion at my 
finger or despair dashing straight at me, en route from 
Washington to Baghdad?   
 Rosmarie Waldrop, Driven to   
  Abstraction  
 
Aber nur das zweite drängt mich zum Schreibtisch.  
Bertolt Brecht, “Schlechte Zeit   
 für Lyrik”  
 
 
The Thing Is 
So a poet, a physicist, and a historical materialist walked into a bar, arriving at 
the door at exactly the same moment. "After you," said the poet. "After you," said 
the physicist. ""After you,” said the historical materialist. “Let me tell you about 
your disciplines,” said the first. “Let me tell you about your disciplines,” said the 
second. “Let me tell you about your disciplines,” said the third. Once inside, as 
was their custom, they went to their separate corners, each to his own 
Stammtisch, the first beneath a sign that read Sein, the second beneath a sign 
that read Da, the third beneath a sign that read Mit. Hedgehogs as they were, 
they drank and thought, thought and drank, until the contours of their reflections 
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began to blur, until they fell, each to his own, into a light stupor. At the end of a 
long evening, seeing no other customers anywhere in sight, the bartender, 
known simply as "H," or “G,” sometimes “W,” who was neither a metaphysician, 
nor a cosmologist, nor a theologian, emerged from behind the counter red-faced, 
in a lather. "Here's the thing. . ." he said, "The thing is. . .”—Which one of you 
hipsters—he might have said disciples, disciplinarians, seminarians— is going to 




The first thing to be said about the question “What is a Thing?” may be that it 
inscribes within itself a constitutive binary, the familiar, foundational sundering of 
“subject” and “object.” In addressing the stakes of this sundering, what I am 
calling its “urgent matter,” I want to ask above all what kind, or genre, the 
question is.  To which discourses, which disciplines, does it belong? Is it, for 
example, “ontological” or “historical,” “cosmological” or “physiological,” 
“psychoanalytic” or “Marxist,” “phenomenological” or “linguistic,” “philosophical” 
or  “lyrical”? From which angles should we attempt to grasp it, this curious (idea 
of a) thing? Is it (un)knowable? Can we (re)read it? Can it be (un)read? What 
approach should we use to get near, keep our distance, steer clear? When will 
we know that, and what, we know? Will such knowledge be “constative” or 
“performative”? “Fact” or “interpretation”? Whose question is the question of a 
thing, anyway, and to whom does it belong? Where does it come from now?  
As digital technologies and electronic media have come to inform virtually 
all current imaginings, or better, accountings, of what Walter Benjamin called the 
“time of the now” (Jetztzeit), it has become harder than ever to be what Friedrich 
Schlegel termed a “hedgehog” (ein Igel). In ways Schlegel’s Universalpoesie 
both anticipated and could never have envisioned, the World Wide Web has 
placed all things, including all discourses and disciplines, in ceaseless, 
simultaneous, virtual conversation at the click of a mouse, or the swipe of a 
finger. In this context, the relative autonomy of the aesthetic sphere, including of 
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that hedgehog of hedgehogs, “poetry,” seems largely a “thing” of the past, relic of 
a time when the individual could still claim to be, in ways it has become more 
difficult than ever to claim in the age of social media, the locus of experience in 
the modern world. 
Opening questions about “things” onto the bureaucratically-maintained, 
compartmentalized, discursive, disciplinary claims of “philosophy,” “theory,” and 
“poetry,” I want to explore these three terms in relation to one another through 
attention to recent work by Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Rancière, and the 
German-American poet Rosmarie Waldrop (born Sébald, 1935), who moved to 
the United States in 1958 and received a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from 
the University of Michigan 1966. The essay’s fifth and final section, “Poetry 
among the Discourses,” concludes with brief attention as well to the German poet 
Ulf Stolterfoht (b. 1963), whose fachsprachen. Gedichte. I-IX (1998; Lingos I-IX. 
Poems. 2008) Waldrop rendered into English in an award-winning translation 
published by the influential Burning Deck Press she has run for the past four 
decades with her husband, the poet and translator, Keith Waldrop. 
“A medium,” Friedrich Kittler writes in Discourse Networks—echoing 
Gertrude Stein’s famous declaration about that most “poetic” of things, the 
“rose”—“is a medium is a medium.” While the “logic of media,” Kittler argues, 
“may be a truism in set theory or information theory,” that logic emerged “for 
Poets,” following the fin-de-siècle preceding our own, as “the surprise of the 
century”: 
 
Before they founded The New Empire, the kingdom of blank 
machine-written bodies of words, poets more than any other profession 
[my emphasis] remained faithful to the classical discourse network. The 
translatability of all discourses into poetic signifieds endowed poets with 
such privilege that only bitter experience forced them to renounce their 
constitutive illusions. For an entire century, poets had worked with 
language as if it were merely a channel. . . . / In 1900, the exchange broke 
down. The norn with whom a Poet bartered his imaginative visions for 
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words is no longer a Mother, the one who, as the unarticulated beginning 
of articulation, guaranteed unlimited expression. The norn has only a 
bourn or treasury in which signifiers coexist spatially as denumerable 
elements. . . . Whereas poetic translation was led on by the constant 
promise of fulfillment, literature is a transposition of media; its structure it 
first reveals, in the best positivistic and consequently Dasein-analytic 
manner, by deficits. (265-69) 
 
Deconstructing Heidegger’s representation of poetry as the genre that opens 
onto The Word and/as pure Being, which he rightly understands as a form of late 
Romanticism, Kittler understands Stefan George’s “kein ding sei wo das wort 
gebricht”—quoted two pages from the end of Waldrop’s 2010 Driven to 
Abstraction before the phrase, “No words, no fact before signs” (131)— as an 
acknowledgement that “The Word” no longer opens, in poetry any more than in 
any other kind of discourse, onto transcendental signifieds (Nature, Spirit, the 
Soul), but onto “the ethic of a media professional” (268). If according to 
Nietzsche, as Kittler argues, “language exists only because nature has thrown 
away the keys to its secrets” (269), and if poetry is understood, as Heidegger and 
Agamben too understand it, as the discourse that comes closest to revealing 
those secrets, the discourse that possesses the “saving power,” in Heidegger’s 
terms (das Rettende), of a certain transcendens, as anti- or non-commodified 
language, Waldrop’s Driven to Abstraction suggests that such transcendence is 
no more in the offing in poetry than in the discourse of what Kittler calls other 
“media professionals” (269). While poetry seems constantly to have been placed 
in the position of having to defend its claims in relation to other discourses and 
media, the Web has placed those claims in a more precarious position than ever. 
If “a picture is worth a thousand words,” and if poetry is understood to be an 
“image-saturated” discourse, the ubiquitous availability and circulatability of all 
other forms of media, of visual images as easily as of words, runs the risk of a 
precipitous decline in poetry’s claims to even a relative autonomy. Who needs 
metaphorical “images,” however sharply defined, however suggestive, when we 
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can have the “real” (photographic, filmic, digital) thing, no longer verbal but 
visual, no longer merely “imaged” in language, but right before our eyes? The 
instantaneous, endless production, reproduction, and circulation of visual 
images, as ubiquitous now as words and as readily available, threatens to make 
metaphorical visualization, metaphors as occasions for visualization, obsolete. 
Notwithstanding bureaucratically enforced divisions and concentrations within the 
academy that have come increasingly to seem residual, the consequences of 
such obsolescence for poetry are enormous, transformative and far-reaching, 
threatening its very sense of itself as a thing apart from other discourses and 
media, a “thing” with its own discursively autonomous identity. If in what 
Benjamin called the “age of mechanical reproduction” (im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit), in Kittler’s words, “Man (and woman) no longer 
need to live by words alone, or by The Word, alone” (269), how much more so in 
the age of digital reproduction and new media. As the contemporary poet’s 
privilege and authority have become increasingly bureaucratic, managerial, a 
managing above all of various poetically normative subjectifications, whether 
individual or collective,  personal or tribal, the “object” of poetry, poetry’s “thing,” 
its “urgent matter,” comes increasingly into question, its claims to cultural 
authority residing no longer in  the promise of  revealing transcendental 
signifieds, but in its discursive, disciplinary status as what Lyn Hejinian has called 
a “language of inquiry,” its status as, in Heidegger’s own articulation, a form 
above all of questioning (das Fragen). Understanding itself no longer apart from 
other discourses but in relation to them, as what Kittler calls “an information 
network” among others, “like all literature” (371), poetry faces the need to 
reposition itself as a kind of system-thinking, network-thinking, no longer the 
possession of an individual “I.”  
 Recalling Brecht’s reflections on what drove him to write poetry in a “dark 
time”—in “Schlechte Zeit für Lyrik” and “An die Nachgeborenen,” respectively—
Waldrop’s Driven to Abstraction poses programmatic questions about poetry’s 
relation to “things” in our contemporary context, including the urgent matter of 
poetry’s relation to other discourses and disciplines. The history of "things” in 
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modern poetry, as Waldrop understands, is a history of manifestos, of slogans, of 
"branding." The thing is the brand and the brand is the thing. No things but in 
brands, no brands but in things. The difference between the "things" called 
"poetry" and "philosophy," now as institutionalized within the academy, is not 
epistemological, ontological, ahistorical, but a matter of linguistic domains, of so-
called concrete "images" as the policed domain of the former and of "abstraction" 
as the equally policed domain of the latter.  In being “driven to abstraction,” not 
only in her book by that name but throughout her career, Waldrop challenges that 
institutionalized dichotomy perhaps more resolutely and effectively than any 
other contemporary poet, encouraging an embrace of both “feeling” and 
“thinking,” of “affect” and “concept,” not as contraries, but as mutually constitutive 
and informing. Not direct presentation of the thing, then, but awareness of the 
thing as thoroughly mediated. No things but in ideas. No things but in feelings. 
No feelings, no ideas, no things, but in language: “No things without words, no 
fact before signs, no specie, no prior body? The signs I write down here 
preceded by signs preceded by signs? Turtles all the way down? In signs we 
trust. To build balconies out over the void” (131). 
Aligning the “loosely phenomenological” method of his recent Phenomenal 
Reading: Essays on Modern and Contemporary Poetry (2012) with 
phenomenology’s “widespread resurgence in the humanities” since the 1990s, 
Brian M. Reed writes that such an approach is  
“concerned with offering ‘a direct description of our experience as it is,’ ‘an 
account of space, time, and the world as we ‘live’ them’ (Merleau-Ponty vii).’” 
Such an account “presumes differential embodiment” in a “perceiving subject” 
who has “a history and an array of attributes and affiliations that uniquely inflect 
his or her experience of the world or, to put it more accurately, that prompt the 
world to disclose itself to him or her in a unique way.” This “return to 
phenomenology” reminds us of the value of narrative as  
 
a tool for conveying the intricacy, contingency, and richness of perceptual 
and affective experience. Narrative can incorporate paradox, accident, 
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and mistake in addition to laying bare causality, logical connection, and 
the mechanics of moral and ethical judgment. It registers intermittent 
doubts, changes in perspective, accumulations of knowledge, and 
alterations in mood. It records facts, counterfactuals, and impossibilities. 
Deciding what to include and exclude, what to highlight and what to 
downplay, narrators illustrate their interests, commitments, and zones of 
ignorance. For all these reasons, a narrative can both educate and 
persuade a reader. Here, it quietly asserts, is a possible plausible account 
of an event (or a life or a book) from a particular point of view. Authors can 
show audiences how they perceive and experience the world, that is, the 
manner in which, a Heideggerian might say, the world reveals itself to 
them as a world. (xxi-xxii) 
 
As Reed’s emphasis on narrative makes clear—notwithstanding the  initial, 
thoroughly Poundian invocation of a ’direct description of our experience as it is’ 
— “phenomenological” reading reveals nothing “direct” at all about the “thing 
itself,” whether “subjective” or “objective”—to use Pound’s terminology—but 
rather stories about our locations and investments as readers, our reading 
histories, including, within the academy, our disciplinary locations, of which we 
can only seek to become as aware as possible. Thus, within the genre, history, 
discourse, or semantic “field,” as we say, of modern poetry—leaving aside for 
now the question of whether, or in what senses, poetry constitutes an academic 
“discipline”—while a poem such as Paul Celan’s “Weggebeizt” (Atemwende, 
1967) may be said to enact an allegorical “chipping away” at the idea of a poem 
as a coherent, interpretable “thing,” its brevity and intensity tend nonetheless to 
conform, despite its manifest crumbling at the level of both syntax and semantics, 
to a certain understanding of what is to be expected of a poem as textual object. 
The simultaneous indebtedness to and dismantling of the tradition of the 
Dinggedicht, in Celan’s later poetry, thus displays as much continuity as 
discontinuity with received notions of the modern poem as lyric utterance. 
Recalling Poe’s assertion that there is “no such thing as a long poem,” Celan 
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resists yet also reaffirms, in this sense, a foundational gesture in the history of 
modern poetry that reached its most succinct articulation in Pound’s (Axis-
Powers inflected) bilingual formulation: “Dichtung = condensare.”  
Abandoning the limitations of Imagist “condensation” almost as soon as he 
had articulated its enormously consequential slogans, Pound’s “image” poems, 
like Rilke’s Dinggedichte,” with all their textual reifications (Verdinglichungen), 
ultimately only succeed in reopening, however much they might appear to wish to 
foreclose, the question of the relation between “thing” and “idea” which is also, as 
Agamben has recently reminded us, a question of the “apparatus.” If, as 
Heidegger posited in “The Question Concerning Technology,” the “essence of 
art” (das Wesen der Kunst), and of poetry as art’s quintessence, is questioning 
[das Fragen], the poem, as thing, as “techné,” as “apparatus,” is precisely not a 
form of Verdinglichung, but a thing that reopens itself consistently beyond mere 
instrumentality, beyond “techné” in the modern sense, to pure poiesis, to the kind 
of unity Heidegger wanted to claim these terms possessed before their modern 
sundering from each other (Einstmals trug nicht nur die Technik den Namen 
techne…, 43). To the extent that poetry may have become, as Mikhail Bakhtin 
claims in The Dialogical Imagination, the very discourse that cannot question 
itself, it faces the same challenge other disciplines face—that of resisting its own 
reification in the name of an ongoing self-questioning.  
 
Prescriptions and Prohibitions 
In the century now passed since the original publication of Ezra Pound’s “A Few 
Don’ts by an Imagist” (Poetry, 1913), an era increasingly defined by U.S. 
economic and military domination and the expansion of English as a global 
language, Pound’s essay has remained arguably the most programmatic 
statement in the history of modern poetry, a statement whose seminal definition 
of the “image” has been at once monumentalized and betrayed in the century-
long history of its reception. Appearing in 2010, three years before Pound’s 
Imagist manifesto’s centenary anniversary, Waldrop’s Driven to Abstraction 
offers a powerful coming to terms with that essay’s enduring legacy, within a 
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transnational, global context, for poetry’s complex positioning in relation to other 
discourses and disciplines.  
Calling into question the binary procedures that continue to dominate 
language use in diverse discursive/disciplinary cultures generally and in the 
culture at large, the linguistically self-referential, appositional procedures of 
Waldrop’s work contribute to the development of an alternative logic that does 
not so much “contradict” (speak against) such procedures as offer ways to speak 
and write otherwise, to use language in ways that are neither linear, nor so much 
without direction, as multi-directional, a complex of adjacency, of asides, of 
digression, of errancy, of being “alongside,” in lieu of being “opposed to,” that 
constitutes at once a poetics, an aesthetics, an ethics, and a politics.   
If modern poetry may be said to have had a single dominant, a persistent 
if not at times unquestioned, unchallenged hegemonic emphasis extending from 
Pound’s Imagism and Rilke’s Dinggedichte even into the first two decades of the 
current century, it has surely been that of poetry as the cite of the “thing-as-
image,” of the “image-as-thing,” of the “image-thing” or “thing-image” as the sine 
qua non of the specificity and particularity of what is called “poetry.” In 
introductory survey courses, as in the rapidly multiplying number of creative 
writing programs and courses—the latter still only beginning to take root in other 
countries—that have come to play such a pivotal, even dominant role in defining 
poetry’s discursive, disciplinary location within the academy in the United States 
over the past several decades, modern poetry has sought to establish its bona 
fides and raison d’être above all as an image-saturated-discourse, as a 
“discipline” in precisely this sense—or should we perhaps say as an “a-“ or “anti-
,” an “in-“ or an “other-than” discipline—with an institutional “room of its own.”  
Yet a funny thing happened on the way to what we might call the age of 
the “image-thing,” or “thing-image.” Its dominance, its persistence, its discursive 
conquest “within” poetry, its ontological, ahistorical claim to be, in effect, what 
poetry is, what counts, if anything may be said to count, as poetry, has tended to 
come at the expense, at least in a certain recognizably dominant practice, of half 
of Pound’s inclusive definition of the image as at once “an intellectual and 
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emotional complex in an instant of time.” While mainstream poetic ideology since 
the emergence of Imagism and the Dinggedicht—quickly superceded in Pound’s 
own poetic practice by the expansively ambitious, integrally abstract, 
emphatically cerebral project of The Cantos, Pound’s lifelong “poem including 
history”—has continued to emphasize the pursuit of original “images” as the mark 
of a poet’s distinction, the complex understanding of the image Pound 
articulated—at once “intellectual” and “emotional,” what might be called these 
days “conceptual” and “affective”—has tended in dominant mainstream practices 
to be subject to a radical reduction, a purging from poetry of abstract, 
“philosophical” language fully authorized by Pound in what has remained, to the 
detriment especially of poetry’s conceptual capacities, perhaps his most famous 
imperative: “Go in fear of abstractions.” 
 
THE IMPERTINENCE OF EXPLANATION. Immense field of possibilities 
divided by square roots, the travel through micro-macro rhythm so 
unpredictable.(“Music,” 50:12) 
 
. . . We’re now in the glory of not knowing what we’re doing. . . . (“Music,” 
52:14) 
 
 As often as Pound’s prohibition has been invoked over the past century in 
the dutiful instruction of how poetry is to be written and what counts as poetry (an 
alternate version of which is the ubiquitous “show, don’t tell”), it is worth noting 
that Pound goes on immediately to justify his proscription in the context of 
addressing what he does not hesitate to call “an intelligent person” with the 
primary aim of affirming the dismantling of the simple conflation between “poetry” 
and “verse” a half-century earlier in Poe’s “The Poetic Principle” and “The 
Philosophy of Composition” that made possible the prose-poetic revolution of Le 
spleen de Paris. 
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More and more we are getting nowhere, and that is a pleasure. (“Music,” 
57:19)  
 
We grow thin by exclusion. (“Music,” 58:20) 
 
 While the very legitimacy of a poem as poem has come to be associated 
since Pound in hegemonic fashion with the quality of “images,” and while poetry 
itself has come to be defined as a predominantly image-saturated discourse, it is 
worth noting that in articulating what he crucially refers to as the “complexity” of 
the “image,” Pound does not define it in a way that would attest to its conceptual 
purity, affirming its provenance from the history of specifically “poetic” discourse 
and thus a certain intra-disciplinary authority and autonomy “within” the field of 
what is called “poetry.”  
 
ANYTHING MAY HAPPEN AND IT DOES. . . . Listening as ignorance. . . . 
What we need is irresponsibility.. . . an upward leap into the air, whatever 
the consequences.  (“Music,” 59:21) 
 
. . . Let’s admit that the lines we draw are not straight. After a life of 
correctly brushed teeth, we prefer parentheses and italics. Rules of 
misbehavior. . . . Ordinary disorder vibrates into surprise. (“Music,” 60:22) 
 
Rather than telling us in other words, as it were, on poetry’s own terms, what 
makes a poem a poem, Pound has recourse to a definition, for a specific 
understanding of what we might call “poetry’s image”—the kind of “image” 
specific to poetry that makes a poem a poem—that depends for its own authority 
on recent developments within another, newly emerging discipline, the discipline 
of “psychology”: “I use the term ‘complex’ rather in the technical sense employed 
by the newer psychologists, such as Hart, though we may not agree absolutely in 
our application.” Where the combined efforts of Poe and Baudelaire contributed 
decisively to the dismantling of the simple equation “poetry” = “verse,” building on 
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Wordsworth’s “the language of Prose may yet be well adapted to Poetry; . . . a 
large portion of the language of every good poem can in no respect differ from 
that of good Prose.” Pound moves in the opposite direction, crossing disciplinary 
boundaries between “poetry” and “psychology”—a crossing “natural” enough 
following Romanticism’s affirmation of the poem as above all a form of 
autobiography—to establish a new doxa, the equation of “poem” and “image,” for 
which the minimalist “In a Station of the Metro” came to serve as a virtually 
“pure,” “conceptual” emblem and exemplum, the very Idea of the image, of the 
image (almost, but not quite) as Idea, the image of the image of the image . . .  
 So that, again, immediately following, so richly, paradoxically placed under 
the subheading “Language,” Pound delivers his prohibition, not against images 
but, as if down the from heavens, or from Olympus: “Go in fear of abstractions.” 
Preceding which, as we have now to mention, before any of the above 
prescriptions and proscriptions, “A Few Don’ts” famously ventures the following: 
“1. Direct treatment of the ‘thing’ whether subjective or objective.” If such an idea 
of poetry, as of language generally, was made untenable in advance, and at the 
very time of its articulation, by the elaboration of modern linguistics inaugurated 
by his Swiss contemporary, Fernande de Saussure, the consequences of 
Pound’s turn to psychology rather than linguistics could scarcely have been more 
persistent for American poetry’s understanding of its place and purpose among 
the disciplines, including the current stage of pervasive institutionalization of 
programs in “creative writing” in the United States throughout higher education, 
where it has come to dislodge, for the time being it appears rather decisively, the 
prestige and currency of courses of whatever orientation in “literary criticism” and 
“theory.”  
 
What Then Does the Poet? 
 
     Wirklich, ich lebe in finsteren Zeiten! 
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If the chain of associations that leads modern poetry from “things” to “images” to 
poems as “image-things” or poems as “thing-images” continues to hold sway, 
that equation is sustained perhaps above all by the reduction of Pound’s complex 
formulation to an affiliated doxa, the conflation of “image” with “emotion,” or 
“affect,” that has its roots in an equally diminishing, equally consequential 
reduction, that of the complex poetics articulated in one of the foundational texts 
of British Romantic poetry, Wordsworth’s “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads (1798). 
As the Poundian image has come to be associated in the century since its 
complex original formulation almost exclusively with “emotion” and the 
suppression of “abstract” in favor of “concrete” nouns—so the Wordsworthian 
understanding of poetry has come to be reduced to a distressing extent, despite 
the efforts of critics and theorists to the contrary, to the “spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feeling” and “emotion recollected in tranquility.” Like Pound’s recourse 
to another discipline, as also his emphasis on the “intellectual,” conceptual 
stakes that give the image its desired complexity, Wordsworth’s program for 
poetry too has tended to be stripped, in its by now two-century reception, of a 
complexity that involves, even more explicitly and expansively than Pound’s 
definition of poetry, a richly cerebral, multi-disciplinary engagement and 
contextualization.  
Responding to his own fundamentally discipline-oriented questions 
(“Taking up the subject, then, upon general grounds, let me ask what is meant by  
language is to be expected from him?”) Wordsworth responds by first 
situating poetry in relation to Philosophy, poetry’s traditional discursive Other 
since Plato’s expulsion of poetry from the polis and its subsequent reclamation 
and reabsorption by Aristotle, to whom Wordsworth attributes (interestingly 
enough, by hearsay) a dismantling and subsumption of the philosophy/poetry—
we could also say of the intellectual/affective, conceptual/affective—binary: 
 
Aristotle, I have been told, has said that Poetry is the most philosophic of 
all writing: it is so: its object is truth, not individual and local, but general, 
Konturen VIII (2015) 
 
22 
and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into 
the heart by passion. 
 
Immediately following this restaging and dismantling of the initial, ancient, 
foundational, for all theoretical and practical purposes unavoidable 
Platonic/Aristotelian discursive-disciplinary binary, Wordsworth complicates 
poetry’s discursive position, in strikingly non-binary, multi-disciplinary terms, 
attempting to distinguish it from the work of “the Biographer and Historian . . . a 
lawyer, a physician, a mariner, an astronomer, or a natural philosopher, . . . a 
Man. ” Further contrasting “poetic” knowledge and practice (“What then does the 
poet?”) and that of the “Man of science, the Chemist and Mathematician, . . . the 
Anatomist’s, . . . the Botanist, or the Mineralogist,” anticipating with considerable 
anxiety what today we might call the poet’s disciplinary status, Wordsworth 
struggles to lay claim to a specificity of the poetic project that would guarantee 
both its intellectual/conceptual and emotional/affective authority. 
Perhaps the greatest fiction, mythology, ideology that has taken hold in 
American poetry since Pound is that “true” speech, the truest speech, by which is 
meant not speech that opens onto ideas but rather, with a more Aristotelian 
orientation, affective speech, is speech that is said to “reach” what Wordsworth 
alternately calls “sensations,” “sympathies,” “feeling,” “emotion.” In this respect, 
the dominant ideology of American poetry over the past century inaugurated by 
Pound’s “imagist” proscriptions—ideological precisely to the extent that the 
dominant poetic culture does not perceive it as ideology, but as truth—has been 
that linking the hegemony of the “image” with with that of “feeling” tout court.  
To write a poem is to write in “concrete” images, and to write in images is 
to communicate, above all, “feelings,” to the exclusion, above all else, of 
“abstraction,” which is to say of abstract nouns, which is to say of thinking, of 
what Pound called the “intellectual” side of the “complex” character of the 
“image,” which is to say above all of “collective” (sociological) as distinct from 
“individual” (psychological) thinking, including the orientation of what is called 
thinking—as philosophy, as theory—toward generalization, classification, 
Konturen VIII (2015) 
 
23 
categorization. Installing, thus, against the “complex” prescription that the 
“image” should be conceived as at once “intellectual” and “emotional,” the virtual 
apartheid that has come to reign since in the mainstream of modern poetry 
between poetry and philosophy, Pound continues: 
 
Pay no attention to the criticism of men who have never themselves 
written a notable work. Consider the discrepancies between the actual 
writing of the Greek poets and dramatists, and the theories of the Graeco-
Roman grammarians, concocted to explain their metres.  
 
. . . . If I try to say the whole thing in one sentence I say the same thing 
over and over.  (72:8) 
 
My writing is nothing but a stutter. (76:12)  
 
 
The Poet as Contemporary 
 
Was sind das für Zeiten . .  . 
 
Explicitly warning his readers “not to consider such a prescription as ‘dogma’”—
“never consider anything as dogma—but as the result of long contemplation, 
which, even if it is someone else’s contemplation, may be worth consideration”—
Pound recalls Wordsworth’s qualification that the “spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings” is based in “deep thought.” Complicating and resisting, in the 
very moment of his articulation of an “imagist” theory and practice, the 
subsequent hegemonic alignment of modern poetry with what we might call the 
affective image, in its most diluted form reduced to mere picturism, the merely 
visual or “tangible” sensation, Pound anticipates what Jacques Rancière has 
called, in his trenchant critique of the aesthetic ideology of the later Roland 
Barthes of Camera Lucida,  “the affective power of sheer presence,” the 
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”punctum” he contrasts with the “studium,” which asks to be “decoded and 
explained.” Echoing Pound’s “complex” understanding of the image as at once 
“intellectual” and “emotional,” Rancière reminds us of a “specific regime of 
‘imageness’, a particular regime of articulation between the visible and the 
sayable . . . the legible testimony of a history written in the faces or objects and 
pure blocs of visibility impervious to any narrativization, any intersection of 
meaning.” Attentive throughout to what Rancière calls the “solidarity between the 
operations of art, the forms of imagery, and the discursiveness of symptoms . . . 
the twofold power of aesthetic images: the inscription of the signs of a history and 
the affective power of sheer presence,” Driven to Abstraction names explicitly, 
and continues to elaborate decisively, Waldrop’s life-long commitment to a 
poetics of the “image” in the full sense Pound’s original definition intends, but 
with a linguistic self-reflexivity that understands the image’s “intellectual and 
emotional complex” as a “thought-provoking matter,” above all, of language. 
Against the dominant tendency of modern poetry over the past century 
toward the diminishment of the Poundian project expansively conceived, Waldrop 
has continued to elaborate a diverse, ambitious body of work that extends into 
new territory both the Poundian project of the “complex” image and its 
Wordsworthian corollary, the Aristotelian understanding of poetry as “the most 
philosophic of all writing.” 
 
The idea that ceaselessly. A string of beads. Of follies. Of particles. . . .  
Infinite progressions. Delirious possibility. . . .  
 
A system of numbers . . . conventions of syntax and grammar. 
Conventions instead of. . . . (91) 
 
 What we call the “image” is never, as Waldrop understands with Rancière, 
“a simple reality.” If the term may be said to consist of “several functions whose 
problematic alignment constitute the labour of art “(1), including especially 
“operations that couple and uncouple the visible and its signification” (4), Driven 
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to Abstraction calls its readers to a full affirmation of poetry’s discursive power—
beyond “images” in the narrow sense in which that term has too often come to be 
conceived— its capacity to be as intellectually and emotionally complex, as at 
once “conceptual” and “affective,” as it is multi-disciplinary, aesthetically, 
linguistically, philosophically, economically, politically aware and self-reflexive as 
the medium and history of poetry at its best demand, a measure of our times, of 
being “contemporary.” 
Inquiring into the character of the “contemporary” in the third and final 
section of his recent, dialectically structured work, What Is an Apparatus? (Che 
cos’è un dispositivo? 2006/2009), Agamben writes, with reference to Roland 
Barthes’ lecture at the Collège de France on Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations 
(Unzeitgemässige Betrachtungen, 1874): “Of whom and of what are we 
contemporaries?’ And, first and foremost, ‘What does it mean to be 
contemporary?” Whether with respect to texts whose authors are “many 
centuries removed from us,” or others “more recent, or even very recent,” it is 
essential, Agamben argues, “that we manage to be in some way contemporaries 
of these texts (39). Where Nietzsche could claim a certain need, even urgency to 
overcome, near the end of the nineteenth century—four decades in advance of 
the deeply presentist prescriptions and proscriptions of the Poundian image’s 
“direct treatment of the thing’, whether subjective or objective”—what he 
described as being “consumed by the fever of history” (40), Waldrop’s Driven to 
Abstraction suggests a sense of urgency in the opposite direction. Playing off the 
idiom “driven to distraction,” an idiom that seems increasingly and pervasively to 
define the character of 21st-century life “on the Web,” Driven to Abstraction 
extends Waldrop’s life-long project of resisting and complicating narrowly 
reductive image-based procedures in favor of a poetics that situates the present 
deeply and intricately in relation to the legacies of the past and the promise of a 
future, in poetry and elsewhere, that would lead us to speak, and write, 
otherwise.  
Understanding “contemporariness” as, in Agamben’s sense, “a singular 
relationship with one’s own time, which adheres to it and, at the same time, 
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keeps a distance from it,” more precisely a relationship with time that “adheres to 
it through a disjunction and an anachronism,”  Driven to Abstraction exemplifies 
Agamben’s recognition that “Those who coincide too well with the epoch, those 
who are perfectly tied to it in every respect, are not contemporaries, precisely 
because they do not manage to see it; they are not able to firmly hold their gaze 
on it. (41) Carrying forward her work’s ambitious refusal to quarantine poetry 
within the confines of a narrowly affective understanding of poetry’s capacities, 
placing it always in conversation with the range of discourses, including 
specifically disciplinary discourses, with which, as Wordsworth gave us to 
understand in his “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads, poetry must contend to 
establish its authority, its contemporariness in the sense Agamben intends with 
respect to Nietzsche’s “actuality” or “relevance” (attualità)  and what we might 
today call its “currency,” in the economic sense into which Driven to Abstraction 
inquires pervasively, most explicitly in “The One Who Counts, Who Paints, and 
Who Buys and Sells” (89-97), the ten-page section of the first of the title poem’s 
four sections, including “Bank-Money” (96-97); “Paper Money” (109-10), from the 
second section entitled “What Has Become of the Subject?”); and “Zenomoney: 
From Promise to Tautology” (129-30), from the third section entitled “Absence of 
Origin.”   
 
If, like The Cantos, Driven to Abstraction attributes great authority to the 
discipline of economics, it is equally well “a poem including history”:  
 
The battle of Agincourt was fought in hours, Waterloo in a day, Gettysburg 
lasted three days, the Battle of the Somme four and a half months, Verdun 
ten, Stalingrad six. There were the Seven- and the Thirty-Years Wars. The 
President told the West Point cadets; ‘Iraq is only the beginning.’” (79) 
 
From the predominantly past-to-present movement that concludes the book’s 
five-section opening poem, “Sway-Backed Powerlines  (2004-2008),” the whole 
of which moves, albeit in the manner of a Benjaminin Tigersprung, from the 
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voyages of Columbus and the conquest of America to the Iraq War, to the past-
to-more-distant-past movement of the book’s four-section title poem (again from 
a self-reflexively “present” perspective) from DaVinci and the development of 
perspective in Renaissance painting to foundational figures in ancient 
cosmology, philosophy, religion, and mathematics—Driven to Abstraction 
understands whatever ideas we may have of poetry’s “image” as inseparable 
from an ongoing conversation with other disciplines, including especially physics 
and cosmology (“All Electrons are (Not) Alike,” Time Ravel,” “Inventions of 
Infinity”); mathematics (“A Little Useless Geometry & Other Matters,” “ Zero, the 
Corrosive Number,” “Zero, or Closing Position”); psychology/philosophy (“What 
has become of the Subject?”; and aesthetics, encompassing music (“Music is an 
Oversimplification of the Situation We Are In”), painting (“Vermeer’s The Art of 
Painting”), literature, reading, and writing (“I Have Made My Booke to No Greater 
Extent Than My Booke Has Made Me,” “Interlude: The Pencil I Chew,” “King 
Lear’s Nothing”). As the interweaving and ultimately ambiguously multiple 
discursive/disciplinary provenances, domains and registers of many of the above 
titles suggest, the positions Driven to Abstraction negotiates for poetry and 
poetics among the disciplines, like the relations of discourses and disciplines 
generally and the book’s intricate oscillations between past and present, public 
and private histories (including frequent references to the speaker’s father and 
mother), remain fluid, unstable, overlapping, its investigations, etiologies and 
teleologies never final, always provisional, always, above all, to be read, not so 
much precisely to be “decoded and explained,” in Rancière’s words, as to 
contribute to an endless unfolding of language in/and as history, Waldrop 
understands poetry’s drive to “abstraction” as inseparable from its drive to 
imagination, figuration: 
 
If signs create the very objects they were thought to represent, . . . thought 
provoking matter, then it’s illusory to think object come first. . . .  An illusion 
whose nature we had orgotten and therefore took for truth. 
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. . . Blue jeans, babies, barges on the Seine, the gondola on the 
Moshassuck, bodies in the Tigris? The woman in purple, the man heading 
into Starbucks, the fish in the water, and the cruise missiles in the sky?  
 
Once literal and figurative, presentation and representation coincide: Zero 
is again a number among numbers. . . . a location among others. . . .  
 
But the subject. Is driven to abstraction. . . Ceaselessly the subject. 
Absents herself. 
 
The world of things, says Plato, is insubstantial. . . . (111) 
 
Can words to the impossible and break through the concept barrier? Can 
things and the names of things blur the way things and space do? . . . 
Writing’s not natural. I stitch it together like the old rhapsodes, The body 
eclectic. (113) 
 
Poetry among the Discourses 
 
Wildtexte, die noch vor Zeiten weite Teile Europas 
besiedelten, haben sich mittlerweile den immer 
spezielleren Anforderungsprofilen unterworfen. . . . Im 
Laufe seiner innigen Partnerschaft mit dem Text hat der 
Dichter bestimmte Eigenschaften gefördert, gemindert 
oder vermischt und so eine stattliche Anzahl von 
lyrischen Typen geschaffen.  
Ulf Stolterfoht, Das deutsche Dichter-
 abzeichen (17) 
  
Reviving in “What Is an Apparatus?” Heidegger’s questions concerning poetry, 
philosophy, and technology, Agamben writes: 
 
It would probably not be wrong to define the extreme phase of 
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capitalist development in which we live as a massive accumulation and 
proliferation of apparatuses. . . . today there is not even a single instant in 
which the life of individuals is not modeled, contaminated or controlled by 
some apparatus. In what way, then, can we confront this situation, what 
strategy must we follow in our everyday hand-to-hand struggle with 
apparatuses? What we are looking for is neither simply to destroy nor, as 
some naively suggest, to use them in the correct way. 
. . . At the root of each apparatus lies an all-too-human desire for 
happiness. The capture and subjectification of this desire in a separate 
sphere constitutes the specific power of the apparatus. [17] 
 
 
What kind of an apparatus, then, is a poem, and what, in Agamben’s revisiting of 
Heidegger’s questions, are poets for? If, as Agamben argues, “terminology is the 
poetic moment of thought,” which nevertheless does not say “ that philosophers 
must always necessarily define their technical terms,” as “Plato never defined 
idea, his most important term” (3), what may be said to characterize Driven to 
Abstraction perhaps above all, and most impressively, interwoven throughout 
with its sustained attention to poetry’s place among the discourses and 
engagement with other disciplines (if poetry may be said to be a “discipline”), is 
its sustained attention to questions of language, to poetry and poetics as an art 
and science of signs in the most capacious sense of the word.  
Developing his idea of the “contemporary” with reference to Osip 
Mandelstam’s 1923 poem, “The Century,” Agamben writes that in figuring “the 
backbone of this age” as “shattered,” the poet, “insofar as he is contemporary, is 
this fracture, is at once that which impedes time from composing itself and the 
blood that must suture this break or this wound” (42). He continues: 
   
The poet—the contemporary—must firmly hold his gaze on his own time. 
But what does he who sees his time actually see? . . . . The contemporary 
is he who firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as to perceive not its 
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light, but rather its darkness. . . .  the contemporary [the poet] is the 
person who perceives the darkness of this time as something that 
concerns him, as something that never ceases to engage him. (44-45).  
 
The burden, or gift, of contemporariness, “inscribes itself in the present,” 
Agamben argues, “by marking it above all as archaic . . The present is nothing 
other than this unlived element in every thing that is lived.” (50-51). 
 Reading Driven to Abstraction in light of this understanding of the poet’s 
work—the task Agamben does not hesitate to assign to the poet, the true 
“contemporary” who “makes of this fracture a meeting place, or an encounter 
between time and generations” and thus intervenes, in redemptive fashion, in 
what he calls with Benjamin “messianic time,” the “’time of the now’” (51)—it is 
tempting to understand the book’s title as an overcoming of the idea of the 
image, narrowly conceived, through a counter-investment in the idea of the idea, 
Plato’s “most important,” yet forever undefined term. To read Waldrop’s work as 
a redemptive suturing of this binary, of “image” and “idea,” would nonetheless 
betray what is arguably the book’s most important contribution, namely, its 
refusal, in the name of the endless multiplication, subtraction, and division of 
signs, of language as boundless potential to provide alternative logic(s), logics 
other than binary—not reducible, for example, to the dialectic of “darkness” and 
“light” with which Agamben brings to a theological close his reflection on the 
“contemporary,” the logic as well of Agamben’s insistent recourse to the rhetoric 
of the “on the one hand”/”on the other hand” (no phrases occur more frequently 
in The Future of the Image)—other than dialectical, other than oppositional, 
logics that would elude capture even by the book’s alluring yet limited closing 
imperative: “Contradict as needed” (133). 
What may be said to characterize Driven to Abstraction perhaps above all, 
and most impressively, together with its sustained attention to poetry’s place 
among the discourses and engagement with other disciplines, is its sustained 
attention to questions of language, to poetry and poetics as an art and science of 
signs in the most capacious sense of the word.  




. . . . Absence of things, of signs. Unnatural. . . .  
 
. . .  A signifier with a shape that could be traced in ‘learned dust,’ on wax, 
on paper. A body unbound by words like nihil, niente, nada, nothing, 
nichts, and even zilch. 
 
Like the phoneme that makes possible language. Neither physical nor 
psychological reality, but a value with an abstract and fictive importance. 
That enables. (115) 
 
“When I say poetry is an exploration of language,” Waldrop earlier wrote in 
“Alarms and Excursions,” it is not a retreat from the social, because language is 
the structure that is shared by society and this otherness that is poetry. It also 
does not mean that there is no reference. It means that references is secondary, 
not foregrounded. The poem works by indirection, but the poet’s obsessions and 
preoccupations will find their way into the text.” (Dissonances, 171-72). 
If, as Agamben asserts with Benjamin, “the historical index contained in 
the images of the past indicates that these images may achieve legibility only in a 
determined moment of their history,” and if it is contingent on us to develop our 
capacity “to respond to this exigency . . . to be contemporaries not only of our 
century and the ‘now,’ but also of its figures in the texts and documents of the 
past” (54), Waldrop’s consistently complex, linguistically self-referential, multi-
disciplinary investigations, which understand “images” and “ideas,” “affect” and 
concept,” as inseparably interwoven, offer an alternative akin to Agamben’s 
invocation of the typos or “figure” (53), yet in an other-than messianic way that 
includes the open-ended promise, at once “image” and “idea,” less a final 
“redemption” than an ongoing conversation—of what we might call a continuing, 
a way of thinking, feeling, imagining, using language that elaborates topoi other 
than Agamben’s opposition between “the darkness of the present” and “a light 
that can never reach its destiny.” (54).  
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Understanding “images” and “ideas,” “affects” and concepts,” as 
inextricably interwove, Waldrop’s consistently complex, linguistically self-
referential, multivalent, multi-disciplinary investigations offer an alternative logic 
of continuing, of thinking, feeling, imagining language in ways more intricate, 
subtle, and inclusive than instrumental, adversarial uses of language allow. If 
Waldrop is “the one who, dividing and interpolating time, is capable of 
transforming it and putting it in relation with other times,” who is “able to read 
history in unforeseen ways, to ‘cite it’ according to a necessity that does not arise 
in any way from [her, not his] will, but from an exigency [Driven to Abstraction] to 
which [she, not he] cannot respond,” her other-than “theoretical” [yet not not-
theoretical] interrogation, she is also the one who teaches us how to respond to 
our “determined moment” of history, to be “contemporaries not only of our 
century and the ‘now,’ but also of its figures in the texts and documents of the 
past . . .” (54)  
It is supremely difficult, as Waldrop give us to understand, to develop a 
language other than that of the “not/but,” the “either/or,” even the “both/and.” Yet 
perhaps nothing, in our time of the “now,” could be more urgent, could drive us 
more thoroughly to distraction, if not collective self-annihilation. To say, I don’t 
say not, but other than, “contradict as needed,” to speak, to write otherwise: 
 
Power of writing. Or toughness of paper? kein ding sei wo das wort 
gebricht. No thing without words, no fact before, no fact before signs, no 
specie, no prior body? The signs I write down here preceded by signs? 
Turtles all the way down? In signs we trust. To build balconies out over the 
void. 
 
Many have thought the voice might save the body. From the abstractions 
we live in. . . .  
 
. . . If there is no redemption by voice any more than by gold. If signs are 
irreparably dislocated from what I supposed to be their signified. How 
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instantly then our writing, like our knowledge, becomes subject. To ever 
new interpretations and directions. Unsuspected futures. Off-shore 
versions of its previous self? 
 
. . . At the bottom of any thing I find a word that made it. And I write. Have 
made a pact with nothinggness. Make love to absent bodies. And though I 
cannot fill the space they do not occupy their shadows stand between me 
and thin sky. (131-32) 
 
“Contradict as needed.” An invitation, then, not so much to write against, to 
contest, as opposed to, not for naught, not for knots, not for nothing, so much as 
for speaking and writing alongside, adjacent to, even with. That is the challenge, 
and opportunity, Waldrop’s work presents to us, to think, to feel, to imagine, to 
use language in ways irreducible to the binary “clashes” Rancière characterizes 
as the obsolescent “avant-garde” poetics of a certain modernist aesthetic regime. 
If ours is time when, as Rancière argues, “the age of images is behind us,” the 
further development of an appositional poetics, of which Driven to Abstraction 
provides a exemplary typos, is a promising place to begin. 
Thus Ulf Stolterfoht, in fachsprachen (Lingos)—a nine-year project 
encompassing four books of nine parts each for a total of 36 parts (I-IX, 1998; X-
XVIII, 2002; XIX-XVII, 2004; XVIII-XXXVI, 2009)—at once assembles and 
dismantles poetic “objects,” poems-as-things. Inviting and at the same time 
defying hermeneutic appropriation, coherence, cogency, argument, and 
intelligibility, from the most micro- to the most macro- levels, both syntactically 
and semantically, Stolterfoht’s parodic interanimations and disassembling of 
every kind of specialized language, including that of poetry, call into question the 
very plausibility of anything like a Bakthinian “speech genre,” as well of individual 
speakers as “ideologues.” As with Hejinian’s notion of poetry as a “language of 
inquiry,” the ceaseless questioning of language enacted in Stolterfoht’s 
fachsprachen is not so much a questioning of the utility of poems as poems, but 
a questioning in and by texts that agree to “look” and “sound” like “poems” of the 
Konturen VIII (2015) 
 
34 
very idea of the utility of what Agamben calls the “massive accumulation and 
proliferation of apparatuses,” in the case of Stolterfoht’s “lingos,” of language-
apparatuses conceived of precisely in and as a wild variety of unruly, always 





wörter fallen nicht vom himmel. historisch wachsen 
sie heraus. das dauert. bis (unmündig aber selbstver- 
schuldet hörig) zu den knöcheln im tier das sprießen 
der geweihe tritt—ein magischer moment: der wolf 
 
 
gerade dann heranrennt wenn man nennt—bleibts einem 
engländer vergönnt “dem spekulativen begriffsgebäude 
der scholastic den entscheidenden stoß zu versetzen”: 
nichts stehe mehr für anderes! was marktkonform sofort 
 
gedichtverknappung zeitigt. da aber hinterkopf reserve 
“im” bald schwerer wiegt als heute wert papier gedanke 
“auf” spricht manches für nicht nur: erzeugerseits be- 
trieben. fast sicher künstlicher natur zeigt funktionalen 
 
riecher. in ähnlich einprägsamer formung geht längst ein 
unwort um an neckar spree und ruwer: von gegenstrebiger 
vereinigung wie der des reihers mit dem rogen / in herge- 
brachter sage: staatlich gestützter prosa-verstromung. 
 
beginn des großen dichterdarbens. leicht für die wörter 
mit dem wolf zu heulen. hysterisch schnüren sie heran. 
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gewaltverhältnis ungeklärt. ihr gut verzahnter fang: erzeu- 
gerzugewandt! zeigt sehr wahrscheinlich rißbereitschaft an. (83) 
 
 
muttersprache 1972/2:  
material resistance 
 
words don’t drop out of the sky. from history they 
grow. which takes forever. until (under age but  
self-enslaved) animals beside their ankles sprout  
antlers—magic moment: the wolf comes running 
 
just when one cries wolf—leave it to an Englishman 
to ‘give scholasticism’s speculative system the coup 
de grace’: let nothing stand for nothing else! the 
market promptly reacts with poetry cutbacks. but 
 
since brains (reserves ‘in’) then are valued almost  
more than bond paper (thoughts ‘on’) there’s  
much to be said for not just: supply-side. almost 
certainly artifice but a nose for what will work. 
 
likewise a memorable non-word has long been 
circulating round the rivers neckar ruwer spree: 
a joining against the grain as that of egret and roe/ 
in plain speech: state-supported verstromung-prose. 
 
begins the great poet famine. easy for words to  
howl with the wolves, hysterically they start to 
dart. power relation unclear. their sharp-toothed 
jaw: producer-friendly! likely ready to tear you apart. (84) 




Stolterfoht’s poems, like Waldrop’s, but with relentless linguistic self-parody, are 
not content to be “poetic” things as such, to play the instrumentalizing, non-
instrumental role of poetry as Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck. Their playfulness 
questions the purposes of a poem as one kind of language-apparatus, however 
heterogeneous, among others, as of all language-apparatuses in a general 
economy of the kind Agamben describes, an economy Stolterfoht figures in the 
above poem’s conceit linking the rapaciousness of capitalism and animality. 
Whatever kind of thing a poem might be, in the hands of Stolterfoht, as of 
Waldrop, it aspires to be other than that. Not an answer, but a question. Not 
Truth, but an unsettling at the core of its values, not a thing in itself but a form of 
self-questioning, of all discourses, all disciplines, that “thing” that binds poetry 
and philosophy together, as urgent matter, in continuing: 
 
 
zwei satzstöcke für gottlob frege 
 
Russell: wenn ich über beispiele von integrität und 
würde nachdenke so wird mir klar daß ich nichts kenne 
was sich mit freges unbeirrbarer wahrheitsliebe ver- 
gleichen ließe. (…) als er nun feststellte daß seine 
 
fundamentale voraussetzung falsch war antwortete er 
darauf mit intellektuellem vergnügen wobei er offenbar 
jeden anflug persönlicher enttäuschung unterdrückte. 
das war fast übermenschlich und ein bedeutsamer hinweis 
 
wozu menschen fähig sind wenn es ihnen um schöpferische 
arbeit und erkenntnis geht. Wittgenstein: nach meinem 
letzten zusammentreffen mit frege standen wir am bahnhof 
und warteten auf meinen zug. da sagte ich zu ihm: sehen 




sie eigentlich nie die geringste schwierigkeit in ihrer 
theorie wonach die zahlen gegenstände seien? er ant- 
wortete: manchmal kommt es mir so vor als sähe ich da 
eine schwierigkeit aber dann sehe ich sie eben doch nicht. (121) 
 
two sentence blocks for gottlob frege 
 
  Russell: as i think about acts of integrity and 
  grace I realize that there is nothing in my  
  experience to compare with frege’s dedication 
  to truth. (…) on finding that his fundamental 
 
 
  assumption was in error he responded with 
  intellectual pleasure clearly submerging any 
  feelings of personal disappointment. this seemed 
  almost superhuman and remarkable evidence 
 
  of what men are capable of when creative work 
  and knowledge are at stake. wittgenstein: after 
  my last meeting with frege we were at the 
  station waiting for my train. I said to him: do 
     
  you really never see the slightest difficulty  
  with your theory that numbers are objects? he 
  replied: sometimes I almost feel as if I saw a 
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